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INTRODUCTION
Can people be harmed after they are gone? If so, by
what means can we protect their posthumous interests? Do
the dead have legal rights? These sequential questions are
not only philosophical puzzles, but are also a problem for
lawmakers and judges in most jurisdictions. This article
approaches a legal problem that crosses the boundary of life
and death, namely how we legally protect dead people,
especially under the civil law system. Historically, the law is
set up to deal with people from the cradle to the grave.
Following the old notion that “the dead do not hear,” the life
of the dead is placed in the memory of the living but
disappears from the scope of legal concern.1 Once a human
being becomes a corpse, on some measures, it may be
viewed as something like “a piece of furniture.”2 But the
corpse is more than a utilitarian object, it is an ambiguous
entity. Consider, for instance, the disposal of the deceased’s
body against the local consuetude,3 harvesting organs

In an early U.S. case, for example, the court held that “libel or slander
upon the memory of a deceased person which makes no direct reflection
upon his relatives gives them no cause of action for defamation.” See
Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 31 N.E. 2d 182, 182-83 (N.Y. 1940).
2 Kieron McEvoy & Heather Conway, The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of
the Past, 31 J.L. & SOC'Y 539, 540 n.4 (2004).
3 For the most recent example, international community urges that
bodies of the dead must be respected soon after the tragedy of Malaysia
Airlines flight MH17 crashed in 2014. Bodies of the dead must be respected:
1
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without prior consent from the deceased, or disclosing of
private information (e.g. medical records). Such examples
show how people can be harmed after death. For centuries,
fundamental legal categories such as personality, rights, and
interests focused on the natural person who is alive. Thus,
traditional civil law has the character of being secular. When
life no longer exists, where should the legal interests lie?
The concept of posthumous harm refers to the harm
caused after the victim has died.4 It is necessary to make a
distinction between harm caused by death and harm after death,
which is often confused in the literature on posthumous
harm. In this article, the phrase “posthumous harm” will be
used to collectively refer to various harms to the interests of
the deceased. The purpose of this article is to clarify the
question of what legal logic should be followed in postmortem relief. This is inevitably a grey zone in legal theory.
It resembles a black box with one end representing the
interests of the deceased and the other end representing the
interests of the living. Unfortunately, very few have asked
what civil law mechanism can connect the two together.
About 9.72 million people passed away in China in
2013,5 which is approximately equivalent to Sweden’s total

Abbott,
THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(July
20,
2014),
http://www.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/bodies-of-deadmust-be-respected-abbott-20140720-3c8o9.html.
4 DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVE 15 (Margaret Brazier & Graeme Laurie, eds. 2008).
5
CHINESE
STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm (last visited Sept.
17, 2015).

142

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

population.6 Unfortunately, few Chinese legal scholars have
queried whether all or some of the posthumous interests
should be advanced or protected as legal rights. In practice,
ancestral graves are eradicated for the purpose of real estate
development without the consent of the grave owners,7 or
the organs of the deceased are donated against the antemortem’s will.8 All of these acts are made in the name of
safeguarding the public interest. However, by simply
soliciting the abstract concept of public interest, the juridical
foundation of posthumous harm cannot be established
convincingly.9
In Chinese culture, on the one hand, respecting the
deceased is a deeply rooted moral claim, and thus,
posthumous interests should be protected. On the other
hand, being accustomed to abiding by the civil law principle
that only the living have legal status, many Chinese judges
find themselves at an impasse. According to my case study
on Chinese Supreme Court’s decisions, judicial attitudes

THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/sw.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2015).
7 In the campaign labeled as ‘flatten graves to return farmland,’ two
million tombs in central Henan province have been destroyed. See Jane
Macartney, Anger as two million graves are torn up to make room for farms,
LONDON TIMES (Nov. 22, 2012), at 40.
8 See Xiao Hang (晓航), jin ping mei si qiu qiguan juanxian jiao ting hou
qiguan bugou yong zha ban (今评媒：死囚器官捐献叫停后器官不够用咋
办?) [This rating media: death-stop organ after organ donation is not
enough to do?] (Dec. 4, 2014), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/zg/jpm/201412-04/1707445.html. There was a rumor of unauthorized use of organs
from deceased prisoners who were convicted of the death penalty.
9 See Xi Xiaoming, QINQUAN ZEREN FA TIAOWEN LIJIE YU SHIYONG
[Understanding and Application of Tort Liability Law] 27 (People’s
Court Press 2010).
6
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toward posthumous harm nowadays are blurred. On this
account, there are many theoretical problems regarding the
compensation for death, mental health damages of the next
of kin, and litigation disputes related to tombs. Therefore,
exploring the problem of posthumous harm is vital to the
drafting of the Chinese Civil Code.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I starts with
existing debates over posthumous harm as the theoretical
background, and the article tries to justify the concept of
posthumous harm.
Part II focuses on the legal practice in China. As the
textual analysis shows, the standpoint adopted for the
jurisdiction of posthumous harm in China is inconsistent.
Uncertainty of law reveals a methodology deadlock: since
the modern times, domains of philosophy of law, such as
personality and rights or rights and interests, center around
the natural living person, thus constituting the legal basis
under traditional civil law. However, the intrusion of the
concept of the deceased has caused a rupture in the “wall of
uncertainty” constructed by the Chinese Civil Code.
Part III then tries to unlock the legal puzzle of
posthumous harm under the civil law system. After the
natural person dies, what are the interests to be protected by
civil law? I argue that posthumous interests can be
categorized into extended interests, converted interests, and
interests of the body. Meanwhile, methodology of legal
fiction, which treats these different concepts as equivalent,
provides a quite reasonable explanation of the civil law
mechanism that crosses the boundary of life and death. At
least, it prevents face-to-face conflicts with the traditional
civil law with worldliness features and makes the rigid law
more flexible by resorting to circuitous strategy.
Part IV attempts to apply the preliminary findings to
the development of Chinese law. I suggest that the

144
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posthumous interests should be protected as legal interests,
rather than legal rights. This approach does not only satisfy
the systemic requirements of modern civil law, but also
preserves the flexibility of legal application. According to the
interest-based model, legal protection can only be taken
when the defendant acts with malice or with gross
negligence when posthumous interests are at stake. It
actually implies the use of common sense: the law protects
the greater interest better—namely, the deceased person is
not and should not be treated on the same level as the living
one.
Part V offers a brief conclusion. I insist that
posthumous harm is not as simple as failing to hold a decent
funeral. In modern society, respecting the deceased is no
longer a vague moral claim, but a legal norm that needs to
be obeyed by the living.
I. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS OF POSTHUMOUS HARM
As the master of utilitarianism, the English
philosopher Jeremy Bentham of the 19th century stuck to the
principle of utility well after his death. His body is still
preserved at the Museum of London.10 Imagine if somebody
stole Bentham’s body. It would be held by the laws of
various countries that this act violates the property right of
the museum (Bentham made an explicit statement to donate
his body to the museum11). If this person randomly disposed

In Bentham’s own words, preserving his body is “oral, political,
honorific, dehornorific, money-saving, money getting, commemorative,
genealogical, architectural, theatrical, and phrenological.” See Dorothy
Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests? Policy Issues for
Research after Life, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 261 (1998).
11 Bentham requested that his body be preserved in this way in his will
10
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the body, took away the bones of Bentham’s fingers to
damage the integrity of the body, or disclosed a secret about
Bentham by using the body, would this be an infringement
of Bentham's rights? A philosophical problem ensues: Is
there any posthumous harm? This fundamental question has
been addressed from varied metaphysical perspectives.
The concept of posthumous harm is still controversial.
The focus of the dispute is the “experience problem,”
namely, “how can one be harmed when one does not know
or experience the evil of harm?”12 The posthumous retention
of interests has engendered vigorous debate among
philosophers. Two scholars in particular, Joel Feinberg and
Ernest Partridge, have academically presented this concept.13
They both arrive at the conclusion that the wishes and
commitments of the dead should be respected, albeit via
different routes.14 However, Partridge claims that a person,
alive or dead, cannot be harmed if he is unaware of the
harm.15
Violation is closely related to the acknowledgement of

made shortly before his death on June 6, 1832: “My body I give to my
dear friend Doctor Southwood Smith to be disposed of in a manner
hereinafter mentioned, and I direct . . . he will take my body under his
charge and take the requisite and appropriate measures for the disposal
and preservation of the several parts of my bodily frame in the manner
expressed in the paper annexed to this my will and at the top of which I
have written Auto Icon.” AUTO-ICON, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/BenthamProject/who/autoicon (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
12 See SPERLING, supra note 4, at 15.
13 See generally JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW 181-82 (Cornell Univ. Press, Vol. 1 1984) (Discussing
four categories of causally necessary conditions).
14 Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous
Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 935-36 (1997).
15 Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341, 343-46 (1987).
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the existence of interests. In legal practice, it is very difficult
for judges to answer the issue of the “experience problem.”16
For example, in the United States, “courts must address
whether the post-mortem pregnant woman has interests that
can be infringed upon by surviving parties or the state.”17
Similarly, Chinese courts often have to determine whether
the dead retain interests, especially on Tomb-Sweeping Day,
which is a national festival for the Chinese people to visit
ancestral graves.18 Presently, this important but unusual
question has not been fully researched by the mainstream
legal scholars in China.
To establish the concept of posthumous harm, as
implied earlier, one has to explore the “experience problem”
raised by many skeptical enquirers.19 In my opinion, the
“experience problem” might be subdivided into two
questions: First, if he or she cannot perceive the fact of
violation, will his or her interests be violated? Second, whose
posthumous harm is actually violated? The former could be
labeled as the “Puzzle of Object,” while the latter is the
“Puzzle of Subject.”

See SPERLING, supra note 4, at 15.
Alexis Gregorian, Post-mortem Pregnancy: A Proposed Methodology for the
Resolution of Conflicts Over Whether a Brain Dead Pregnant Woman Should
Be Maintained on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 401, 404
(2010)
(available
at
http://laweconommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss2/6).
18 See Xiao Zecheng, Mudi Shang De Xianfa Quanli [Constitutional Rights
in Graves], 7 FA XUE [Law Science] 70, 71-72 (2011).
19 Frederik Kaufman, Comments on Death, Posthumous Harm and Bioethics,
40.9
J.
MED.
ETHICS
639,
639-40
(2014)
(available
at
jme.bmj.com/content/early/2013/12/17/medethics-2013-101755.full).
16
17
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A. PUZZLE OF OBJECT: CAN INTERESTS EXIST INDEPENDENT
OF THE MENTAL STATE OF HUMAN BEINGS?
In history, there are two ancient views of life and
death by Aristotle and Epicurus. Aristotle believed that even
the deceased have good and evil (a living person will
encounter good and evil, but he or she has no sense of it at
all).20 Aristotelians argue that death is the most terrible of all
evils.21 Therefore, “not only is death not a harm to the
person who dies, but also that posthumous harm is
impossible and persons cannot be wronged after their
deaths.”22 According to the philosophy of Epicurus, death
has nothing to do with us.23 When a person is alive, he is not
dead, and so his death has not harmed him; if a person is
dead, he does not exist, and so no harm can befall him.24 In a
nutshell, the Epicurean view goes against the Aristotelian
view on harm caused by death but holds a similar opinion
about rejecting the concept of harm after death.25 The
opposing theories of the two philosophers have been the
source of academic disputes for thousands of years.26

See generally Marianna W. Lewis, Exploring Paradox: Toward a More
Comprehensive Guide, 25.4 AM. MGMT. REV. 760, 762 (2000).
21 See generally Robert C. Solomon, Is There Happiness After Death?, 51
PHIL. 189, 189-93 (1976); see also, Kurt Pritzl, Aristotle and Happiness After
Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11, 78 CLASSICAL PHIL. 101, 101-11 (1983).
22 Daniel Sperling, Death, Posthumous Harm and Bioethics, 30 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 285, 285 (2013).
23 James Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics, 56 THE PHIL. Q.
294, 294-97 (2004).
24James Stacey Taylor, The Myth of Posthumous Harm, 42 AM. PHIL. Q. 311,
311-12 (2005).
25 Maria Bitsori & Emmanouil Galanakis, Epicurus’ Death, 22 WORLD J.
UROL. 466, 466-69 (2004).
26 Don Marquis, Harming the Dead, 96 ETHICS 159, 159-61 (1985).
20
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Crucially, both Aristotelian and Epicurean theories cannot
undermine the plausibility of posthumous harm from the
legal perspective.
Can people be harmed regardless of the
consciousness of man?27 Although the philosophical
disputes persist to the present day, the attitude towards
unperceived interests in legal world is different. My sense is
that positive law has taken an explicit standpoint on this:
interests exist regardless of the consciousness of man, and
this belief has pervaded a multitude of civil law. For
instance, a comatose person or a recluse who runs away
from society and spends his life in a deserted land still
enjoys the interests of personality though he remains
incommunicado with the rest of society. Rethinking these
statutory rules can help us solve the “puzzle of
objectivity.”28 Briefly but clearly, I maintain that this puzzle
may be interpreted in three analytical steps.
First of all, unlike its meaning in natural science, legal
objectivity implies public consensus. Dissimilarly, the
objectiveness in natural science can be proved by repeatable
experiments. In the domain of law, if a legal rule is
supported by sufficient reasons, which have been clearly
voiced and publicly commented upon, then the rule has
objectiveness. As Postema argues, legal objectivity “puts the
notion of consensus, or agreement based on public
argument, at the center of the notion of the objectivity.”29
Hence, the objectiveness in the domain of law is built upon

This is the influence of the opinions of Aristotle and Epicurus on
interest theory of the later generation. See generally James Stacey Taylor,
supra note 24, at 311-20 (discussing the myth of posthumous harm).
28 See SPERLING, supra note 4, at 25-34.
29 GERALD J. POSTEMA, OBJECTIVITY FIT FOR LAW, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW
AND MORALS 120 (Brian Leiter, ed. 2001).
27

2015

WHERE LAW MEETS CULTURE

149

the concept of publicity, which gives it a social dimension. In
other words, legal objectivity has nothing to do with a single
person’s consciousness or feeling.30
Next, the objectivity of interests of the deceased is
perceived through public value judgment. The question of
posthumous harm is the question of whether anything that
happens after your death can advance or set back your
welfare.31 Thus, justification for posthumous is closely
bound with the nature of welfare. As Amartya Sen pointed
out, welfare is, after all, a problem of value judgment.32
Happiness and desire may have their meanings, but they are
not sufficient to reflect the values of welfare.33 As long as the
assessment of interests is independent of the awareness of
man, the interests of the deceased can be protected in
accordance with the domain of value judgment. As stated by
ethical intuitionism of Moore, although we know what
goodness is, we cannot prove it.34 Similarly, we may be
unable to prove what the interests of the deceased are, but
we at least know what the interests of the decedent may be
by drawing on the view of public values shared within a
specific field.
Finally, the legitimacy of the interests of the deceased

Posner holds that the best model for legal objectivity is empirical
science because legal objectivity could not be meaningfully found on
practical or legal reason. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 117 (Harv. Univ. Press 1999). If Posner’s
viewpoint is valid, legal objectivity can even be measurable.
31 SIMON KELLER, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LIFE AND DEATH 182
(Steven Luper, ed. 2013).
32 AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 46 (John M. Letiche, ed.
1987).
33 Id. at 46.
34 Aulis Aarnio & Alexsander Peczenik, On Values: Universal or Relative?,
9 RATIO JURIS 322, 322 (1996).
30
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is acknowledged by the view of public value. Why do we
have to protect the interests of the deceased? In my opinion,
there are generally two perspectives on this issue, i.e.
functionalism and moralism. In the former, respecting and
protecting the deceased is the self-regarding need of the
living, which is an incentive for the living. In the latter,
protecting the deceased is to satisfy the self-interests of the
deceased, which is an ethical and moral requirement.35
Although the two postulate different theoretical routes, they
arrive at similar outcomes—that is, acknowledging the
legitimacy of the interests of the deceased.36
If interests are considered as welfare with objective
existence, one’s interests can still be violated regardless of
his or her perception of the violation. Thus, we cannot deny
the objective existence of the interests of the deceased simply
because the deceased has no perception.
B. PUZZLE OF SUBJECT: TO WHOM THE POSTHUMOUS HARM
IS BROUGHT?
The comatose person is, after all, the living rather
than the dead, and thus we need to further explore why the
interests still have objectiveness when they die. That is, how
can the interests be separated from the physical existence?
To answer this question, we have to historically clarify such
misleading notions as personality, personality rights, and
personality interests.

Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect, 91
ETHICS 243, 243 (1981). For more details, see Joan C. Callahan, supra note
15, at 341-42.
36 See JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 45-68
(Prin. Univ. Press 1980).
35
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The concept of personality originates in persona in
Latin, with the original meaning being masks worn on
stage.37 The school of Stoics uses the word persona to refer to
the independent entities that have reason.38 In Roman law,
persona refers to the citizens with the right of freedom.39
Thus, personality is interpreted as the subject qualification of
rights and obligations. German Civil Law in 1896 used the
concept of personality in Roman law with the term legal
capacity replacing the concept of personality.40 The notion of
legal capacity was transplanted to China's civil law in the
late Qing Dynasty, and this term has been used even to the
present day.41
As a typically continental European legal term, the
concept of “personality rights” is generally used to denote

CARLOS ALBERTO DA MOTA PINTO, TEORIA GERAL DO DIREITO CIVIL [The
General Theory of Civil Law] 41 (Macau Legal Translation Office 1999).
38 For Stoics, everyone has a universal persona (communis), insofar as
each person is a human being and not a brute. Meanwhile, everyone has
a particular persona (singulis), which distinguishes each other in terms of
physical prowess, personal appearance, and character. M. ANDREW
HOLOWCHAK, THE STOICS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 206 (Continuum
Int’l Publ’g Grp. 2007).
39 The notion of persona firstly appeared through the Institutes of Gaius in
the 2nd century AD, and later inspired the Institutiones of Justinian’s
Corpus Iuris Civilis in the 6th century AD. PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 7 (Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi, & Partick
O’Callaghan, 2010).
40 István Hoffman & György Könczei, Legal Regulating to the Passive and
Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities
in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the
Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 143, 152 (2010).
41 William C. Jones, Some Questions Regarding the Significance of the General
Provisions of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, 28 HARV. INT’L L.J.
309, 322 (1987).
37
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the bundle of rights aiming at the protection of the integrity
and inviolability of individuals.42 To my knowledge, the
concept of personality rights was created much later than
personality. Roman law contained both positive and
negative definitions of the right of personality that was
divided into honor right and reputation right.43 However, a
uniform concept of personality right did not form until the
Code Napoleon.44 The German Civil Code thereafter wrote
the fundamental provision of personality rights under
Article 823, which refers to the protection of the life, body,
and health of individuals.45 In 1986, Chinese law enacted
General Principles of the Civil Law and used the term
“personal rights” (Ren Shen Quan) to encompass rights of
life, health, personal name, portrait, reputation, honor, and
marriage by choice.46
The origin of the notion of “personality interests” is
hard to trace because it is an open-textured concept. But

In the Anglo-American context, privacy and defamation are the closest
equivalent of the Continental category of “personality rights.” See
Giorgio Resta, The New Frontiers of Personality Rights and the Problem of
Commodification: European and Comparative Perspectives, 26 TUL. EUR. &
CIV. L.F. 33, 34 n.2 (2011).
43 See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Story in the Law of
Artists, Authors, and Creators., 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 556 (1940); see also
Adolf Dietz. The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law
Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 200 (1995).
44 French scholar Hugues Doneau established the modern theory of
personality rights in 1828. See Xu Guodong, Renge Quan Zhidu Lishi Yange
Kao [Historical Evolution of the System of Interests of Personality], 1
LAW AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 5 n.15-16 (2008).
45 See generally Harry D. Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany—Pointers
for American Legislation? 1965 DUKE L.J. 481 (1965).
46 See Zhong Hua Renmin Gong He Guo Min Fa Tong Ze (China), translated
in General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China,
arts. 98-105 (1987).
42
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there is one thing we can be certain about: the concept of
interests of personality was initially used by China's scholars
in civil law to represent the attempt of seeking a balance
between various objects of legal relations, including things,
behavior, and intellectual achievement.47 Because the word
“interests” is flexible, the notion of “personality interests”
means all kinds of inviolability of individuals in China’s
legal sense.48
After clarifying the fundamental notions of
personality, personality rights, and personality interest, we
find that many prevailing views are misleading. On the one
hand, personality is separated from personality rights.
Personality rights were not acknowledged until the 19th
century when self-interest and its motivation were accepted.
The person with a personality does not necessarily have
personality rights. For instance, a legal person enjoys
corporate personality but does not enjoy personality rights.
On the other hand, personality is separated from personality
interests.49 Nowadays, some kinds of personality interests
such as likeness, privacy, name, and credit have profitable
recognition value and hence, “assume some of the attributes

Cao Xianfeng, Lun Deguo Minfa Zhong De Ren, Renge, Rengequan:
Jianlun Woguo Min Fa Dian De Ying Ran Taidu [Research on Person,
Personality and Right of Personality in the Civil Law in Germany: Research on
Theoretical Position about China's Code of Civil Law], 12 L. AND SOC. DEV.
53-65 (2006).
48 Ma Jun-Ju, Cong Renge Liyi Dao Renge Yaosu: Renge Quan Falü Guanxi
Keti Zhi Queding [From Personality Interest to the Element of
Personality—Definition to the Objects of the Personality Right Legal
Relationship], 10 HEBEI L. SCI. 43, 43-49 (2006).
49 In a classic article, Pound defined personality interests as “the
individual physical and spiritual existence.” In my opinion, this
definition confused personality interests with personality. See Roscoe
Pound, Interests of Personality., 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 349 (1915).
47
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of a marketable commodity.”50 Accordingly, it is possible
that personality interests might break away from the specific
entity in the case of commercial use of personality interests.
Such findings help us understand the Puzzle of
Subjectivity of posthumous harm.51 Given that interests can
be separated from personality, the disappearance of
personality does not necessarily mean the disappearance of
interests. During one's life, personality and interest are
united as a whole. Once a human being passes away, the
personality no longer exists, but interests may possibly
survive. The fundamental reason for this is that personality
interests of the deceased are deeply embedded in human
dignity. Human dignity exists because of humanity, rather
than the types and status of the individuals. Of course, the
formation of this point of view takes some time. Several days
before the implementation of German Civil Law, in the
aftermath of the Bismarck Photograph Case of 1899, the
Supreme Court circumvented the problem of personality
interests of the deceased and ruled the returning of the
photograph by the accused because of improper profit.52
This act was criticized as an ostrich policy.53 Seventy years
later, the Mephisto case finally acknowledged the protection
of the interests of personality of the deceased in the form of

Personality Rights in European Tort Law, supra note 39, at 39.
Michael Da Silva, On Barbara Baum Levenbook’s “Harming Someone after
His Death”, 125 ETHICS 1160, 1160 (2015).
52 Basil S. Markesinis & Hannes Unberath, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS A
COMPARATIVE TREATISE 76 (Dr. Walter Odersky et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002).
53 See J. ALDEN NICHOLS, GERMANY AFTER BISMARCK THE CAPRIVI ERA
1890-1894 (Harvard University Press, 1958); see also Robert Hariman &
John Louis Lucaites, Performing Civic Identity: The Iconic Photograph of the
Flag Raising on Iwo Jima, 88 Q. J. SPEECH 363, 363-92 (2002).
50
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legal precedent.54 According to the views of the Federal
Constitutional Court, the right of claiming to respect the
general rights of man should be protected any way.55 This
had an impact on the civil law: the posthumous interests of a
man should be protected in a spiritual aspect.56 In other
words, the protection of the interests of the deceased cannot
be perceived by the deceased, but it is an act of protecting
human dignity.
II. CASE STUDY OF POSTHUMOUS HARM IN CHINA
Borrowing from the methodology of comparative law
analysis, I approach the case study of posthumous harm in
China from two directions, namely “operative rules” and
“legal formants.”57 The operative rules summarize the actual
judicial decision of posthumous harm in China, while the
legal formants comprehensively explain the legal basis and
arguments behind the rules.

Stephen R. McAllister, Would Other Countries Protect the Phelpses’
Funeral Picketing? 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. 409, 411 (2010); Marc Chase
McAllister, Human Dignity and Individual Liberty in Germany and the
United States as Examined Through Each Country’s Leading Abortion Cases,
11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 491, 495 (2004).
55 Hannes Rösler, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights – An Analysis
of U.S. and German Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 153,
155 (2008).
56 DIETER SCHWAB, GENERAL THEORY TO CIVIL LAW 93 (2006).
57 See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law (2nd installment) 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 358 (1991); see also Mauro
Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private
Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 345 (1997).
54
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A. OPERATIVE RULES
Turning to the operative rules of posthumous harm, I
will discuss a judicial case in China. According to local
customs, deceased persons should be buried at the right time
or else it will bring bad luck to the dead’s family.
Unfortunately, due to the sudden mechanical breakdown,
the funeral parlor delayed “the right time” of interment. This
case sparked a controversy of whether the defendant
infringed upon the interests of the deceased. The court
decided that “the dignity of human personality cannot be
separated from the subjects having subjective consciousness.
The subjects without subjective consciousness do not have
the dignity of human personality.”58 However, in another
similar case, the court issued an opposite ruling. When a
retired teacher committed suicide by jumping from a high
building, the school authorities had the body cremated
without informing the deceased’s relatives, and the court
found that interests of the deceased’s personality were
violated.59
These two cases evoke concern about judicial
opinions in China. Both cases were ruled on by primary
courts, which rendered the two cases atypical, or at least not
influential. Then, what standpoint did the Supreme People's
Court take concerning posthumous harm? There are two
texts to be reviewed, i.e. relevant judicial interpretation and

See Wu Jianbo, Wu Yanping, Wu Jianbing, Wu Jieping Su Panyang Xian
Yan Chi Huo Hua An [Lawsuit of delaying cremation against Poyang
County filed by Wu Jianbo, Wu Yanping, Wu Jianbin and Wu Jieping]
Panyang People’s Ct. 951 (2006) (China).
59 See Gao Mou Su Chongqing Mou Xueyuan An [lawsuit brought by Gao
against an university in Chongqing], Fifth Intermediate People’s Ct. of
Chongqing 225 (2006) (China).
58
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the representative cases published by Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Gong Bao (hereinafter “SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ.”).60
1. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF POST-MORTEM REMEDY
The Supreme People's Court has published five texts
of judicial interpretation concerning posthumous harm:
a. Reply by the Supreme People's Court on the
Protection of the Reputation of the Deceased (hereinafter
“1989 judicial interpretation”);61
b. Reply by the Supreme People's Court on the Legal
Proceedings of the Case Filed by Fan Yinglian against Jing
Yongxiang for Violation of Reputation Right of Haideng
Master (hereinafter “1990 judicial interpretation”);62
c. Reply by the Supreme People's Court on Several
Questions Related to the Hearing of Reputation Right Cases

The judicial interpretation and cases published in Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao (hereinafter SUP. PEOPLE’S
CT. GAZ.) are approved after the discussion of judicial committee of the
Supreme People's Court. They represent the judicial standpoints of the
Supreme People's Court. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Shen Pan Wei Yuan
Hui Gong Zuo Shou Ze [the Working Principles of Judicial Committee of
the Supreme People's Court], 1993 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 23 (1993)
(China).
61 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Siwang Ren De Mingyu Quan Ying
Yifa Baohu De Fuhan [Communication regarding the Legal Protection of
the Decease’s Right to Reputation by the Sup. People’s Ct.] (promulgated
by the Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 12, 1989, effective Apr. 12, 1989) (China).
62 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Fan Yinglian Su Jing Yongxiang Deng
Qinhai Haideng Fashi Mingyuquan Yi An Youguan Susong Chengxu Wenti
De Fuhan [A Reply of the Supreme People’s Ct. Concerning the
Procedure Issues of the Defamation Case of Fan Yinglian v. Jing
Yongxiang] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 27, 1990,
effective Dec. 27, 1990) (China).
60
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(hereinafter “1993 judicial interpretation”);63
d. Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court on
Several Questions related to Determining the Obligations of
Spiritual Damage Compensation for Infringement of Civil
Rights (hereinafter “2001 judicial interpretation”);64 and
e. Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court on
Several Questions related to the Applicable Laws of Personal
Injury
Compensation
(hereinafter
“2003
judicial
interpretation”).65
Among them, the 1993 judicial interpretation and 2001
judicial interpretation mark two turning points. In the 1993
judicial interpretation, the notion of the “right of reputation”
of the deceased was abandoned and the term “reputation”
was used.66 In the 2001 judicial interpretation, the scope of
personality interests of the deceased was expanded to name,

See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Mingyuquan Anjian Ruogan
Wenti De Jieshi [A Reply to Certain Issues Concerning Judging
Defamation Cases by the Sup. People’s Ct.] (promulgated by the Sup.
People’s Ct., Aug. 7, 1993, effective Aug. 7, 1993) (China) [hereinafter “A
Reply to Certain Issues Concerning Judging Defamation Cases by the
Sup. People’s Ct.”].
64 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen
Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi [Interpretation of the Supreme
People's Court on Problems regarding the Ascertainment of
Compensation Liability for Emotional Damages in Civil Torts]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2001, effective Mar. 10,
2001) (China).
65 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Renshen Sunhai Peichang
Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruoguan Wenti De Jieshi [Interpretation of the
Supreme People's Court of Some Issues concerning the Application of
Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 4, 2003, effective May. 1,
2004) (China).
66 A Reply to Certain Issues Concerning Judging Defamation Cases by
the Sup. People’s Ct. supra note 63.
63
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image, reputation, honor, privacy, body, and human
remains.67
2. ISSUED CASES OF POST-MORTEM REMEDY
So far, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. has officially issued
four cases of posthumous harm. In the case “Chen Xiuqin
against Wei Xilin and Today Evening News of Tianjin for
violation of reputation right in 1990” (hereinafter “Chen
Xiuqin Case”), the accused made up a story and violated the
reputation rights of both the deceased and the living
people.68 It was ruled by Tianjin Intermediate People's Court
that the deceased still enjoys the legal protection of
reputation right.69 Plaintiff Chen Xiuqin was the mother of
the deceased, Ji Wenzhen, and she had the right to file a suit
against those who violated the reputation right of her
daughter and herself, and to appeal for legal protection.70
However, the court ruled the contrary for the same
case of making up stories in “Li Lin sued Xinshengjie
Magazine and He Jianming for the violation of reputation

Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Problems regarding
the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emotional Damages in
Civil Torts, supra note 64.
68 In this case, the defendant published a novel based on the decedent’s
life and stated that she died from a sexually transmitted disease. The
dead’s mother alleged defamation and illegal appropriation of the
likeness of her daughter. The court held that the dead’s right to
reputation should be protected. [Lawsuit brought by Chen Xiuqin
against Wei Xilin and Jin Wanbao] (Tianjin Interm People’s Ct. 1989)
(China).
69 Id.
70 Zhonghu arenmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gongbao [Gazette of the
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China], 1990 SUP.
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 30 (China).
67
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right” in 1997 (hereinafter “Li Siguang Case”).71 The court in
the first instance ruled that the accused violated the
reputation right of the deceased, and in the second instance,
also ruled that even the posthumous reputation should not
be violated.72 If the posthumous reputation of citizens are
violated, their close relatives are entitled to pursue a claim.73
It should be noted that in the judgment of second instance,
the term “reputation” replaced “reputation right.”
There is another case of right infringement by the
media, namely “Peng Jiahui filed against the Chinese Story
magazine in 2002 for the violation of reputation right”
(hereinafter “Peng Jiazhen Case”).74 The Higher People's
Court of Sichuan ruled that the act of making up a story
about the accused violated the reputation right of Martyr
Peng Jiazhen.75 Regarding the problem of whether the

In this case, plaintiff sued a journal as well as an author for maligning
her dead father by publication a documentary novel. The defendant was
held liable for defamation. [Lawsuit brought by Li Lin against
Xinshengjie Magazine and He Jianming] (Beijing High People’s Ct. 1997)
(China).
72 Id.
73 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gongbao [Gazette of the
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China] 1998 SUP.
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 33 (China).
74 Lawsuit brought by Peng Jiahui against China Story Journal, Sichuan
High People’s Ct. 2002. In this case, the plaintiff’s brother was a hero and
who died in an assassination in 1912. However, the defendant published
a novel claiming that the brother escaped the killing and proceeded to
engage immoral relationship with various women. Specially, the plaintiff
passed away during the appeal and her children were allowed to
continue the appeal and inherit the damages. The court affirmed the
defamation charge. See Zhonghu arenmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan
gongbao [Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic
of China], 6 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 196 (2002) (China).
75 Id.
71
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interests of the living were violated, it was stated in the
judgment that the act of filing a claim against the magazine
for violation of the reputation of Martyr Peng Jiazhen by the
relative Peng Jiahui was to safeguard the reputation of Peng
Jiazhen, rather than the reputation of herself.76 The ruling in
the first instance that the reputation of both the deceased
and the relatives were violated has no legal basis.77
In 2007, a case aroused widespread attention, namely
“the Civil Administration Bureau of Gaochun County,
Jiangsu accused Wang Changsheng, Lü Fang, and Jiangsu
Branch of Tian An Life Insurance Co. Ltd for human injury
compensation” (hereinafter “Anonymous Case”).78 This case
makes us reflect upon the following issue: How does the
infringement of the interests of the deceased bring about the
substantive claim made by the relatives of the deceased?

Id.
Id.
78 Zhonghu arenmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gongbao [Gazette of the
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China], 6 SUP.
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 32 (2007) (China). The description of the case is as
follows: a nameless vagrant was killed in a car accident, and his close
relatives were nowhere to be found. Can the Ministry of Civil Affairs file
a lawsuit as the plaintiff? The supporters believe that if the Ministry of
Civil Affairs do not safeguard the interests of the vagrant, it will be an
act of not respecting the right of life of the deceased. The opponents
believe that the Ministry of Civil Affairs have the obligations of relief,
but cannot execute the right of claim as a surrogate. The court finally
ruled that the Ministry of Civil Affairs was not a qualified plaintiff of
civil litigation, and the complaint was rejected.
76
77
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Figure 1. Posthumous Harm Cases in SUP. PEOPLE’S CT.
GAZ.
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B. LEGAL FORMANTS
As textual analysis shows, the standpoint adopted for
the jurisdiction of posthumous harm in China is inconsistent.
The Chinese court in the Chen Xiuqin Case first admitted the
protection of the interests of the deceased in 1990.79 This was
not prudent legislation, but rather it was a legislative
response to external pressure because personality rights
were central to the economic reform movement.80 An
illustration of this point is the fact that the two earlier
judicial interpretations were made in the form of reply by
the Supreme People's Court’s instruction to the lower court.

See Lawsuit brought by Chen Xiuqin against Wei Xilin and Jin
Wanbao, supra note 68.
80 Hilary K. Josephs, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and the Press in the
People’s Republic of China, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN. L.J. 191, 192 (1992).
79
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Academic opinions also differ greatly. In light of the
actual problems of judicial practice, Chinese scholars have
proposed the following representative ideas: protection of
the rights of the deceased, protection of the interests of the
deceased, protection of the rights of the close relatives,
heritage of the interests of personality, family interests, and
extended protection.81 All of these ideas attempt to provide a
legal basis for posthumous harm relief. However, I found
that most scholars are faced with a predicament: if the rights
of the deceased are acknowledged, then it contradicts the
system of legal capacity; if the rights of the deceased are not

See generally Ge Yunsong, Sizhe Shengqian Rengeliyi De Minfa Baohu
[protection of civil law for ante-mortem interests of the deceased], BIJIAOFA
TANJIU [J. COMP. L.] 4 (2002). For earlier representative opinions, see Guo
Lin and Zhang Gu, Shilun Woguo Minfa Dui Sizhe Mingyuquan De Baohu
[On Civil Law Protection on the Reputation Right of the Deceased in China],
SHANGHAI FAXUE YANJIU [SHANGHAI JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY] 6 (1991);
Lixin Yang, Renshen Quan Fa Lun [Personal Right Law], BEIJING: CHINA
INSPECTION PRESS 273 (1994); Wang Liming, Rengequan Fa Xin Lun [New
Ideas on Personal Right Law], CHANGCHUN: JILIN PEOPLES PRESS 444 (1994);
Ma Changhua, Lun Sizhe Mingyu De Falü Bao Hu [Legal Protection on the
Reputation of the Deceased: a Discussion with Yang Lixin and others], FA
SHANG YANJIU [STUD. IN L. & BUS.], 6 (1996). For a more detailed
elaboration on the above theories, see Ge Yunsong, Sizhe Shengqian
Rengeliyi De Minfa Baohu [protection of civil law for ante-mortem interests of
the deceased], BIJIAOFA TANJIU [J. COMP. L.] 4 (2002). For earlier
representative opinions, see Guo Lin and Zhang Gu, Shilun Woguo Minfa
Dui Sizhe Mingyuquan De Baohu [On Civil Law Protection on the Reputation
Right of the Deceased in China], SHANGHAI FAXUE YANJIU [SHANGHAI
JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY] 6 (1991). Yang Lixin, Renshen Quan Fa Lun
[Personal Right Law], BEIJING: CHINA INSPECTION PRESS, 273 (1994); Wang
Liming, Rengequan Fa Xin Lun [New Ideas on Personal Right Law],
CHANGCHUN: JILIN PEOPLES PRESS 444 (1994); Ma Changhua, Lun Sizhe
Mingyu De Falü Bao Hu [Legal Protection on the Reputation of the Deceased:
A Discussion with Yang Lixin and others], FA SHANG YANJIU [STUD. IN L. &
BUS.] 6 (1996).
81
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acknowledged, then it is difficult to fulfill the moral
requirements which should be met by the civil code.
Behind this predicament is a methodology deadlock:
since the year 1900, such domains of philosophy of law as
personality and right, or right and interests, all center
around the natural living person, thus constituting the legal
basis of traditional civil law.82 However, the intrusion of the
concept of the deceased has caused a rupture on the wall of
uncertainty constructed by the civil code.83 We have to admit
that the theoretical predicament results in the loss of
direction in practice. Thus, we are compelled to return to the
logical origin of the theory of civil law. I believe that the
legal justification could be found in the basic domains of the
philosophy of law.
In sum, the deceased people cannot rise from the
grave to file a lawsuit. We have to establish a legal
mechanism that enables the living to safeguard the
posthumous interests. I will provide the answer of legal
fiction to this issue.
III. LEGAL REASONING OF POSTHUMOUS HARM IN CIVIL LAW
In reference to the “historical development of law,”84
to quote Maine, “legal fiction is the tortuous route of law
development usually chosen by ‘a curious artifice of legal
reasoning.”85 The interests of the deceased are fictionalized
as the rights of the living based on an accepted hypothesis,

See Xianfeng, supra note 47, at 53-65.
Herman Shael, From Philosophers to Legislators, and Legislators to Gods:
The French Civil Code as Secular Scripture. 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 597 (1984).
84 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 16 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1977).
85 Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
1 (2010).
82
83
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i.e. that the civil law is historically set up to deal with the
living. Consequently, the legal capacity of human beings is
simply configured between life and death in civil law.86 To
achieve equilibrium between systematic harmony and the
protection of the deceased, I would hereby argue that civil
law has to construct the bridge between life and death by
virtue of legal fiction as a tortuous way of law development.
A. POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS ON THE TEMPORAL SCALE
Insulting the body may be a crime, whereas spitting
on the portrait of the deceased only incurs moral accusation.
After the natural person has died, what are the interests to
be protected by civil law? Considering when a posthumous
interest occurs (prior to, at, or after death), I divide the
interests of the deceased into three types in accordance with
the occurrence point on the temporal scale: extended interests,
converted interests, and body interests.

This notion is definitely expressed at art. 1 of German Civil Code: “The
legal capacity of a human being begins on the completion of birth.” See
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2002, § 1, sentence
1, (Ger). Similarly, the French Law No. 75-17 in 1975 made it clear in art.
1 that “The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault
on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being
from the beginning of life.” See Loi No. 75-17 du 17 janvier 1975 relative à
l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse [Law No. 75-17 of January 17,
1975, Regarding Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan.
18, 1975, p. 739; see also Laurence Brunet & Sonia Desmoulin, ‘Human
Embryo, Chimerical Embryo: What Legal Status in French Law’, 1 J. CIV. L.
STUD. 85 (2008).
86
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Figure 2. Types of Interests of the Deceased
Harm after Death
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1. EXTENDED INTERESTS
Here, I designate the interests, which start in the
living period and are preserved after death as the term
extended interests. Under the legal context in China, not only
do they include most of the non-pecuniary interests such as
privacy, name, image, and reputation, but they also include
some pecuniary interests, such as the publication right.87
From the perspective of the temporal scale, all extended
interests originated during the life of man, and the content of
those interests are consistent before and after the point of

Under Chinese law, “copyright” shall include seventeen types of
personal rights and property rights. As the foremost right among them,
“the right of publication, that is, the right to decide whether to make a
work available to the public.” See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Zhu
87

Zuo Quan Fa (中华人民共和著作权法) [Copyright Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Pres. Order No. 31 of Sept. 7,
1990, effective June 1, 1991; amended by Standing Comm. Nat’l People's
Cong., Feb. 26, 2010), art. 10.
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death.88 In fact, violating the publication right of the
deceased is derived from the fact that the author possesses
the identity of an author before death. These interests occur
during one's life; they are the natural extension of antemortem interests and, hence, I name them “extended
interests” in this article.
The main feature of extended interests is that legal
protection crosses the boundary of life and death. In judicial
practice, the cases of posthumous harm are mostly related to
the violation of non-pecuniary interests of the deceased,
typically the reputation.89 In my opinion, there is no
substantial difference between reputation infringement to
the deceased and the living, because both center around the
social comment on ante-mortem behavior. For instance,
defaming X during his life is the same as defaming him after
his death. As long as it impairs the social reputation of X, the
act can be considered a violation.
2. CONVERTED INTERESTS
If a person is killed in a car accident, why are his close

For example, according to the Article 21 of Copyright Law of the
People's Republic of China, “[i]n respect of a work of a citizen, the term
of protection of the right of publication and of the rights provided in
Items (5) through (17) of Paragraph 1 of Article 10 of this Law shall be
the lifetime of the author and fifty years after his death, expiring on
December 31 of the fiftieth year after his death. In the case of a work of
joint authorship, such term shall expire on December 31 of the fiftieth
year after the death of the last surviving author.” Id. art. 21.
89 In China, the earliest and most controversial cases regarding to
posthumous harm are related to defamation of the dead. See Lawsuit
brought by Chen Xiuqin against Wei Xilin and Jin Wanbao, supra note 68,
and Lawsuit brought by Li Lin against Xinshengjie Magazine and He
Jianming, supra note 71.
88
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relatives entitled to claim the monetary compensation for his
death? At first glance, the answer seems straightforward.
However, we may ignore a simple truth: personality rights
are personal, but the plaintiff actually profits from the
other’s death. Thus, the question arises: Who is matter-offactly harmed, the decedent or his relatives?
In my opinion, the legal basis of pecuniary
compensation for death can be interpreted by the term
converted interests. This type of interest moves between the
deceased and the third party. For example, at the moment of
X's death caused by a car accident, the chain of causality can
be described as follows in jurisprudence:
X’s unlawful death → violation of right of life → the
compensation for damage of death is generated → the deceased
person, X, cannot claim this compensation → the compensation
interests are transferred to the close relatives of X.
The phenomenon of converted interests is more
complex than extended interests due to the fact that its
occurrence and capturing are almost synchronous. However,
the logical model only exists in the imagination of the jurists.
The general public only notices the death of X as the cause,
and the death compensation right enjoyed by the close
relative of X as the effect.90 The specific causal relationship is
ignored, which is the reason for a multitude of theoretical
disputes.
3. BODY INTERESTS
The body of the deceased is a complex bundle of

See generally David Friedman, “What is ‘fair compensation’ for death or
injury?”, 2.1 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 81, 81-93 (1982) (discussing the
difference between how to compensate a death versus an injury).
90
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interests. On the one hand, it is related to the personality
dignity of the deceased. Body interests aims to secure the
integrity of the body, especially protecting organs of the
deceased against being removed without the approval of the
owner during his life.91 On the other hand, the body is also a
physical entity. After cremation and burial, the family enjoys
the interests related to the grave according to convention.
Therefore, body interests are the combination of personality
interests of the deceased and the family interest of the
deceased.
The violation of body interests is usually entangled
with folk custom, ethics, and spiritual damage. It is perhaps
the most controversial topic in the case of posthumous harm
in China. The grave-related disputes usually have familial
and temporal aspects (near Qingming Festival, which is also
known as Tomb Sweeping Day and noted for its connection
with Chinese ancestral veneration92). The orders are hard to
be implemented due to the deep-rooted Feng Shui concept.93
Many courts face the dilemma of difficult jurisdiction and
execution. According to recent fieldwork by my students in

The events of violating the integrity of the body occur throughout the
world, especially the celebrities. For instance, Einstein made the will of
cremation after death, but his brain was preserved for the name of
scientific research. This event triggered the debate on ethics of science.
92 See generally Alice G. Yick and Rashmi Gupta, “Chinese cultural
dimensions of death, dying, and bereavement: Focus group findings.” 9.2 J.
CULTURAL DIVERSITY 32, 37 (2002) (discussing the different Chinese
rituals related to death and dying).
93 According to the concept of Feng Shui, a graveyard with good Feng
Shui can protect the owner’s offspring and bring them peace, health,
fortune, good luck and other positive qualities. Graveyard Fung Shui,
TRAVEL
CHINA
GUIDE
(last
visited
October
4,
2015),
http://www.travelchinaguide.com/intro/astrology/fengshui/graveyar
d.htm.
91
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Hunan Province, the disputes related to the impaired
ancestral graves (appearance and structure of grave and the
remains buried in the grave) accounted for about 60%; the
disputes related to graves occupying the contracted land of
others or secret burial of the body accounted for 31%; the
disputes related to the scrabble for the bone ash accounted
for about 9%.94
Figure 3. Legal Interests Survive Death95

B. PROCESS OF FICTIONALIZATION
As Fuller noted, legal fiction was “an indispensable
instrument of human thinking.”96 By making an analogy,
different legal facts are attributed with similar legal
interpretation. As a way of explanation, legal fiction is

See Peng Yanhua, Grave Site-Related Disputes (2010) (unpublished)
(on file with the Undergraduate Innovation Project of L. Sch. of Nanjing).
95 Chart areas A and B refer to the legal interests that cannot survive the
death, whereas areas C and D refer to the legal interests that can survive
the death or occur after the death.
96 LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 25 (Stanford University Press, 1967).
94
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frequently used for posthumous harm cases. This prevents
face-to-face conflicts with the traditional civil law with
worldliness features and makes the rigid law more flexible
by resorting to circuitous strategy.97
1. FICTIONALIZATION OF EXTENDED INTERESTS
Legal fiction is to treat the different as equivalent.98
The process of legal reasoning is as follows: suppose α→β,
then α'→β. For example, a corporation is treated as if it were
a natural person, and an adopted child is treated as if he
were reborn as a member of his adopted family.99 In the case
of posthumous harm, similarly, extended interests belonging
to the deceased are treated as if they belonged to the living.
Chen Xiuqin Case is China's first case of posthumous
100
harm. There, the legal reasoning of “treating the different
as equivalent” was adopted:
Death only deprives of legal capacity, but the
specific civil rights acquired during one's life
are still protected by law. For instance, we may
vindicate the victims who die in the political
movements and restore their reputation. It is
an act of protecting the reputation right of the
deceased. For criminals sentenced to death, the

Even in common law, legal fictions “were the primary tools to deal
with new situations or to do justice without disturbing the law’s putative
stability.” Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate
Uses of Legal Ficton in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 58 (1989).
98 See FULLER, supra note 96, at 21-22.
99 See Knauer, supra note 85, at 9-10.
100 See Lawsuit brought by Chen Xiuqin against Wei Xilin and Jin
Wanbao], supra note 68.
97
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criminal law specifies that their political rights
are deprived. This shows from another
perspective that the ante-mortem civil rights of
citizens are still protected by law after death.101
Literally, α (the living citizen with legal capacity) is
not equivalent to α' (the deceased without legal capacity).
But, since α→β (violation of reputation right), it can be
inferred that α'→β (violation of reputation right). The device
of legal fiction baldly treats the two different legal facts in
the same way. Consequently, a human being’s legal interests
during life are extended to the period after death in China's
judicial decision. The 2001 Judicial Explanation considered
the personality interests such as name, portrait, reputation,
honor, and privacy of the deceased as the extension of the
ante-mortem interests.102 Meanwhile, Article 21 in Copyright
Law in China extends the ante-mortem publication right of
the author to 50 years after death.103 These two articles
represent the legal logics of ‘treating the different as
equivalent.’

Zhonghu arenmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gongbao [Gazette of
the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China] 2 SUP.
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 30, 31 (1990) (China) [hereinafter “2 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT.
GAZ. 30”].
102 See Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Problems
regarding the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emotional
Damages in Civil Torts, supra note 64.
103 According to this article, the term of protection for the right of
publication and other rights shall be the lifetime of the author and fifty
years after his death. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Zhu Zuo Quan
101

Fa (中华人民共和著作权法) [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Pres. Order No. 31 of Sept. 7, 1990, effective
June 1, 1991; amended by Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., Feb. 26,
2010), art. 21.
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2. FICTIONALIZATION OF CONVERTED INTERESTS
The protection of converted interests in the case of
posthumous harm is realized by legal fiction as well. In the
case of monetary compensation for death, to explain the
right of claiming by the close relatives, there are two
opposing theories in traditional civil law, namely,
inheritable property or intrinsic damage.104 The controversy
is still going on in China.105 As far as the theory of
inheritable property is concerned, the theoretical dilemma is
that, before the death of the victim, we cannot say that the
right of life has been deprived.106 Thus, the right to life injury
compensation does not survive. After the death of the
victim, the qualification as a civil subject is lost. Hence, the
right to life injury compensation does not hold either.
Although the theory of intrinsic damage seems more
explicit, it also has its defects: the third party suffering from
the loss due to the death of the victim is not the direct victim
after all. Who is matter-of-factly harmed, the deceased
person or his relatives? The jurisprudential basis is not
sound.
Legal justification can be compared to a wellorganized attack on the football field. Sometimes all we need
is the final kick. Rationality of the theory of intrinsic damage

In China's judicial practice, the scope of close relatives of the victims
may not completely overlap with that of the inheritors. Chinese courts
seldom regard the pecuniary compensation for death as the heritage. It
means that the debtee cannot request the close relatives to pay the debt
with compensation money for the deceased person.
105 See Qu Maohui and Wu Bin, Shouhairen Jinqinshu Quewei De Siwang
Peichang Falü Wenti [Legal Issues of Death Compensation in the Absence of
Close Relatives of the Deceased], FA XUE [L. SCI.] 2 (2008).
106 See Friedman, supra note 90, at 82.
104
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is that the interests of the victim and the third party are
clearly differentiated. However, it fails to point out the
logical conversion between the two. In the death
compensation cases, α (basic fact) is the death of the victim;
β (presumptive fiction) is that the intrinsic interests of the
close relatives are violated; γ (judicial outcome) is that ‘the
close relatives claim the compensation.’ Since β belongs to
the fiction, it means that there is no need to prove whether
the intrinsic interests of the close relatives indeed are
violated. The court knows for sure that the intrinsic interests
of the close relatives are not violated, yet the right to claim
compensation still holds.107
Such fiction is the decisive fiction made by the
legislators. It is a legal policy consideration based on logic.
To simplify the legal relations, the legislators may
intentionally (or accidentally) omit the intermediate logical
steps. Thus, the logical chain of α→β→γ has been shortened
to α→γ.108 As long as the basic fact (death of victim) holds,
the judicial outcome of claiming for compensation by the
close relatives occurs. Hence, the interests of the deceased

Consider an extreme situation: parents want to abandon their newly
born baby, who is killed in a medical accident. There is no such thing as
compensation for the acquirable benefits for the fosterers before the
death of the baby. The parents of the baby suffer from no spiritual harm.
However, the hospital cannot refuse to pay the death compensation
using this as its defense. It can be seen that death compensation is a legal
fiction that is not overthrown by counterevidence.
108 Art. 18 in Tort Liability Law (P.R.C.) provides that the close relatives
of the victim have the right to require the infringer to bear the tort
107

liability. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Qin Quan Ze Ren Fa (中华人
民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of
China) (promulgated by Presidential Order No. 21, effective July 1, 2010],
art. 59.
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and the living are bridged.
3. FICTIONALIZATION OF BODY INTERESTS
There are no omniscient legislators in the world.
Where there are no mature legal principles to be applied to a
lawsuit, the judges will resort to a generally acceptable legal
principle to settle the dispute. This tool is another kind of
fiction.
The treatment of body interest is a legal loophole that
remains to be mended. The protection of the integrity of the
body can be analogous to the legal relief given to personality
interests such as reputation, privacy, and image of the
deceased. However, the common interests of the family,
symbolized by the grave, cannot be protected by any mature
legal principles in China.
From the perspective of comparative law, it can be
seen that grave protection is usually implemented by
making an analogy with the ownership of private land. This
does not apply to the transfer of heritage.109 In ancient
China, the grave and the land on which it is situated were
inseparable.110 The disputes over the grave site were usually

By contrast, according to civil law of France, the living spouse and the
closest relatives enjoy rights related to the cemetery, even though he or
she does not inherit the properties of the deceased; the family cemetery
is transferred by lineage, and is jointly owned; it should not be auctioned
or divided. See FRANCOIS TERRE AND PHILIPPEE SIMLER, DROIT CIVIL: LES
BIENS (Dalloz 3rd ed.1985) (France).
110 Family grave land have been generally recognized as the joint family
property, which has existed in China for at least two millennia. See H.
Franz Schurmann, Traditional Property Concepts in China, FAR EASTERN Q.
507, 510 (1956).
109
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settled by resorting to the law for land disputes.111 However,
this method will not work for modern-day China. On the
one hand, since the land is not private,112 the ownership of
the grave and land is separated. On the other hand, the
period of existence of grave site (especially ancestral grave)
is much longer than the history of the People’s Republic of
China. The terms of use “right of contracted land” and
“construction land” are limited usufruct rights.113 Thus,
property law cannot provide stable and predictable relief.
Moreover, if the person enjoying the right to land
contractual management is not the offspring of the owner of
the grave, there will be disputes over ownership. For
example, according to the finding of Peng’s field work,114 the
contracted land of village A in Wugang City, Hunan Province
was the site of ancestral grave of village B. But the residents
of village B forbade the residents of village A to cultivate the

For example, Yu Ling Tu Ce (Scale Atlas) was a basic land registration
system in Ming and Qing Dynasty. The grave sites were registered and
the nature of grave site-related disputes was dispute over land. See Wang
Qingdai, Qingdai Huizhou Yuling Tuce Yanjiu: Yi Xiuning Xian Xinbian
Gongkou Yuling Xianye De Mingkuce Wei Zhongxin [Study of Scale Atlas in
Huizhou of Qing Dynasty: with the Latest Scale Atlas of Xiuning County as
the Center], 4 LISHI YANJIU [HISTORICAL RESEARCH] 53-69 (2006).
112 According to Constitution in China, land in the cities is owned by the
state; land in the rural and suburban area is owned by collectives except
for those portions which belongs to the state. XIANFA art. 10 (1982)
(China).
113 In Chisese property law, “a usufructuary rights holder shall enjoy the
right to possess, use and seek proceeds from the real property or
movable property owned by someone else according to legal
provisions.” See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Wu Quan Fa (中华人民
共和国物权法) [Property Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Oct. 1, 2010), art. 117.
114 See Yanhua, supra note 94.
111
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land. As a retaliation, the residents of village A excavated the
ancestral grave of village B and poured feces on the grave.115
The struggle lasted for eight years.116 Therefore, it is not
feasible to settle the disputes over body interests by referring
to property law. When a lawsuit is filed, the court can only
rule by legal fiction according to the common public order
and customs.
Legal fiction is simple, but it is not a sound approach.
Rather, it is usually a last resort for judges. As a crutch for
thinking, the reasoning process of legal fiction has obvious
defects that make it susceptible to the accusation of cyclic
demonstration.117 The use of legal fiction should be strictly
controlled.
In sum, when the respect for the ethical requirements
of the deceased is not represented by modern civil law due
to the worldliness feature, legal fiction will work as a simple
pathway for legal development.118 At a minimum, it can
provide a reasonable explanation of the civil law mechanism
that crosses the boundary between life and death.
IV. LAW DEVELOPMENT OF POSTHUMOUS HARM IN CHINA
Posthumous cases have been dealt with in the absence

Id.
Id.
117 See KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
[METHODOLOGY OF JURISPRUDENCE] 144 (Chen Ai'e trans., Chinese
Commercial Press 2003) (China).
118 An interesting example of legal fiction that constructs the bridge
between the life and death is posthumous marriage in France, which can
legitimize children born after their father’s death, making them his heirs
under French law. See Craig S. Smith, Paris Journal: A Love that Transcends
Death Is Blessed by the State, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2004), at A4.
115
116
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of a set of clearly defined rules in China for the past 20
years.119 Now China has come to a crossroads. Along with
social development, neglecting the interests of the deceased
is obviously not a wise choice by China's civil legislature.
A. PATH OF RELIEF
Converted interests are fictionalized as the intrinsic
right of the living, as legislated in Article 18 of Tort Liability
Law.120 On the legislative level, the extended interests and
body interests have to be discussed further. Interests, in the
context of civil law, refer to legal interests, both in the
general and narrow sense. The general articles in Tort
Liability Law in China treat interests as equivalent to rights,
which is a narrow approach.121 When the extended interests

2 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 30, supra note 101.
According to the Article 18 of Tort Law of the People's Republic of
China, “Where a tort causes the death to the victim, the close relative of
the victim shall be entitled to require the tortfeasor to assume the tort
liability. Where the victim of a tort, which is an entity, is split or merged,
the entity succeeding to the rights of the victim shall be entitled to
require the tortfeasor to assume the tort liability. Where a tort causes the
death to the victim, those who have paid the medical treatment
expenses, funeral service fees and other reasonable costs and expenses
for the victim shall be entitled to require the tortfeasor to compensate
them for such costs and expenses, except that the tortfeasor has already
paid such costs and expenses.” Tort Law of the People’s Republic of
China (promulgated by Standing Committee of the Eleventh Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) art. 18, at 3.
121 Some Chinese scholars divide legal interests into rights and interests
not yet elevated to rights. The latter category includes the protection of
the interests of the deceased and of fetuses, neighborhood relation,
possession, natural obligation, unregistered trademark, pure economic
loss, commercial secrets, etc. See Sun Shan, Xunzhao Bei Yiwang De Fayi
[Seeking for the forgotten legal interests], 1 FALÜ KEXUE [SCIENCE OF LAW]
119
120
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and body interests are damaged, the decision of whether to
choose protection of an interest-based model or a rightbased model as the path of relief has to be made by the
legislators.122
This is different from common law, which believes
that the evolution of the life of law has been through
experience rather than logic;123 logic is more important than
experience in civil law. “If the logic is wrong, the system will
have intrinsic defects, and all deductions will be wrong.
Though one specific case may conform to experience, the
other cases cannot be dealt with properly.”124 Thus, for
China's Civil Code, which is currently being drafted, the
concepts have to be concise and the logic has to be
appropriate. More importantly, the intrinsic requirements of
the system have to be satisfied. Posthumous harm cases fall
into the category of Tort law.125 However, the basic

2011.
122 According to the Article 2 of Tort Law of the People's Republic of
China, “those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject
to the tort liability according to this Law. ‘Civil rights and interests’ used
in this Law shall include the right to life, the right to health, the right to
name, the right to reputation, the right to honor, right to self image, right
of privacy, marital autonomy, guardianship, ownership, usufruct,
security interest, copyright, patent right, exclusive right to use a
trademark, right to discovery, equities, right of succession, and other
personal and property rights and interests.” Tort Law of the People’s
Republic of China (promulgated by Standing Committee of the Eleventh
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) art. 2, at 1-2.
123 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
124 SU YONGQIN, JOINING CIVIL LEGISLATION AND PRIVATE LAW 22 (Peking
Univ. Press, 2005).
125 From the viewpoint of judges in the Chinese supreme court, cases of
posthumous harm are related to “other personal and property rights and
interests” listed by Article 2 of Tort Law of the People's Republic of
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principles in the general articles of civil code have to be
obeyed, especially the general requirements of the system of
civil subjects. Although the right-based model is clearly
defined, legal capacity is the first problem that needs to be
tackled before conferring rights to the deceased. There are
two solutions to this: abrogating the phrase “legal capacity”
completely or revising the connotation of “legal capacity” to
grant dead people the same right. Both of these solutions
will completely overthrow the existing system of civil
subjects, thus incurring high institutional cost.126
Instead, if the posthumous interests are protected as
legal interests, then the system of civil subjects founded
upon legal capacity will not falter. Moreover, the interestsbased model cannot only satisfy the systemic requirements
of modern civil law, but it can also preserve the flexibility of
legal application. Once the legal interests are upgraded to
rights, the space of freedom of other people will be
restricted, although the individual benefits will be
guaranteed. Thus, the rights with undefined connotations
and objects should be avoided so as to create predictable

China. Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
Standing Committee of the Eleventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009,
effective July 1, 2010) art. 2, at 1-2; see also Xi, supra note 9, at 27.
126 In common law system without the principle of legal capacity, the
legislative examples of directly conferring rights to the deceased are
more popular. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stressed in a judgment in 1991, “[t]he importance of
establishing rights in a dead body has been, and will continue to be,
magnified by scientific advancements.” Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d.
477, 481 (4th Cir. 1991). For representative literature, see Matthew H.
Kramer, Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights? 14 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 29 (2001). It is believed by other scholars that the rights enjoyed by
the deceased should be only moral rights. See CARL WELLMAN, REAL
RIGHTS 146-157 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
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social order. Due to the slow progression of civil law, rights
that protect personality interests will not be protected
immediately.127 We can only guarantee a small range of
interests, leaving many more interests uncovered. There are
many atypical interests of personality that need to be
protected. The precedent case theory, with its high
flexibility, naturally serves as the lubricant for the rigidity of
legislation.
As mentioned above, the interests of the deceased are
entangled with morality, custom, and social policy. Both
connotation and denotation are uncertain. If the protection
of the deceased follows the right-based model, clear
standards should be formulated for determining rights and
providing relief. This creates huge difficulty for legislation.
On the contrary, by referring to the general articles in Tort
Liability Law in China, the interest-based model can be
revised constantly when the interests of the deceased are
protected as legal interests. The flexibility of legal
application not only relieves the burden of civil code, but
also upgrades the law. This is the least-worst solution.
B. RANKS OF HUMAN VALUE
The interests of the deceased are considered legal
interests rather than rights, which implies common sense:
the deceased person is not and should not be treated on the
same level as the living one. At present, there are many cases
of conflict of interests between the deceased and the

See generally Xue Jun, Renge Quan De Lianzhong Jiben Lilun Moshi Yu
Zhongguo De Renge Quan Lifa [Two Basic Theoretical Models of Interests
of Personality and China's Legislation of Interests of Personality], 4 FA
SHANG YAN JIU [STUDIES IN LAW AND BUSINESS] 10-11 (2004).
127
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living.128 A typical example is the prevalence of land
competition between the deceased and the living as the
demand for graves increases sharply, namely the campaign
labeled “flatten graves to return farmland,” in China.129
Moreover, organ donation from the deceased and the
disclosure of disease information prior to death are also
areas where the interests of the deceased and the living are
in conflict.130 Because of the limited judicial resources, the
law cannot protect all kinds of interests, so there has to be a
rank of interests. As Smolensky observed, the fact that an
interest survives death does not mean that this posthumous
interest is under legal protection.131 The general principle is,
to reflect the proper values of society, that law gives greater
protection to the living than to the dead.
The law protects the greater interest better than
inferior interests. On the level of normative jurisprudence,
the priority of values is manifested as the difference in
priority of validity.132 According to the principle of civil law,
protected interests rank lower than protected rights, i.e. the
preconditions for interest protection are stricter than those of

See Xiao, supra note 18, at 71-72.
See Macartney, supra note 6, at 40.
130 See William DeJong, et al., Requesting Organ Donation: An Interview
Study of Donor and Nondonor Families, 7 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 13 (1998).
131 Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763,
773 (2009). Along the same lines, the Study Group on a European Civil
Code uses the term ‘legally relevant’ to limit the interest which is worthy
of legal protection. See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER & MAURO BUSSANI,
PURE ECONOMIC LOSS: NEW HORIZONS IN COMPARATIVE LAW 37
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
132 Dale Smith, Law, Justice and the Unity of Value, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 383-40 (2012).
128
129
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rights.133 In Tort Liability Law of China, legal relief is not
provided to the subjects when his or her interests are
maliciously violated.134 To fix the liability of the offender in
posthumous harm cases, the act of violation, fact of harm,
and causal relationship have to be clear.135 More
importantly, it has to be proven that the offender committed
the violation on purpose.136 For example, pouring feces on
the grave of others and manufacturing advertisements for
gravestones using the image of the deceased without
authorization are all morally accusable. In other words, in
case that posthumous interest is at stake, legal protection can
only be taken when the defendant acts with malice or with
gross negligence.
Exceptionally, the rights of the living rank lower than
posthumous interests under some special circumstances:
First of all, when the ante-mortem wills of the deceased are
contradicted. Suppose A has made a testament that he will
not donate his cornea after death, but his close relative B
believes that the donation of the cornea can benefit medical
research and donates the deceased’s cornea on his own
initiative. This donation is considered invalid and will be
revoked. Furthermore, if the deceased has made a will
during his life not to publish his works, then the ownership
of the manuscripts enjoyed by the inheritors does not
surpass the will of the deceased.137

Randall P Peerenboom, Rights, interests, and the interest in rights in
China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 359 (1995).
134 See Xi, supra note 9, at 26.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 The manuscripts of Franz Kafka, a great master in modern western
literature, were preserved by the will executor Marx Broder, who edited
and published all the works of Kafka against his will. Hence, Kafka won
133
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Additionally, posthumous interests can be elevated
under good social custom. For example, in China's rural
areas, some cemeteries are contracted to others by the village
collectively. This may give rise to conflicts between the right
to land contractual management and the body interests of
the deceased. Although the defendant is a property right
holder, posthumous interest ought to be protected when
superstitious ceremonies are carried out at the cemetery of
the plaintiff’s mother, according to the good social custom,
which should be respected by local residents.138 However,
the good social custom has to conform to the domainspecificity requirement. The funeral custom extensively
accepted by the local residents is considered the standard.
For instance, the “sky burial”139 in Tibetan areas and
“grassland funeral”140 in Inner Mongolian areas are unique
funerals with a complete set of ceremonies. It cannot be

worldwide reputation. If controlled by Chinese Copyright Law, this act
would violate Kafka’s publication right.
138 In this case, the accused dispelled ghosts on the grave of the mother of
resident surnamed Yang in the same village. It was ruled by the court
that the accused violated the reputation right of the deceased and that
the spiritual harm compensation of 350 yuan should be paid to Yang. See
Wu Ruxin, Zai Taren Fenshang ‘Qu Gui’ Qinquan [It is violation of the
Interests of the Deceased by “Dispelling Ghosts” on neighbor’s Grave],
GUIZHOU SHANG BAO [Guizhou Business Daily] (Nov. 29, 2003), at 5.
139 Sky burial (Tibetan: !་གཏོར་) is a funeral practice in which a human
corpse is placed on a mountaintop to decompose while exposing to the
elements or to be eaten by scavenging animals, especially birds of prey.
It is a specific type of the general practice of excarnation. See generally
Funeral reforms edge along in Tibetan areas, SINA ENGLISH (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://english.sina.com/china/2012/1213/537423.html.
140 LiaoYang. The Patriarchal Characteristics of the Funeral Arrangements and
Sacrificial Rites of the Nomadic in Ancient Northern China, 1 NATIONALITIES
RESEARCH IN QINGHAI 146-53 (2007).
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determined as posthumous harm if the body is left unburied
in an open field.
C. LIGATION EXECUTIVE
In posthumous harm cases, the deceased cannot act as
the litigant. Thus, there arises the problem of who is entitled
to the litigation right. The 1993 judicial explanation by the
Supreme People's Court holds that when the reputation of
the deceased is harmed, the close relatives have the right to
file a lawsuit.141 The problem is that when the extended
interests of the deceased are violated, the deceased is still the
subject, and the close relatives are not the subjects of the
legal interests. How can the close relatives of the deceased be
the qualified plaintiffs? To answer this question, I suggest
that the litigation executive theory can be applied to
improve the procedural law for posthumous harm cases.
When the subject of litigation and the civil subject are
one and the same, it is an ideal scenario for civil cases.
However, the separation of the two is not rare. In a typical
case, the will executor, liquidator, and the collective
copyright management organization enjoy the litigation
right but no substantive rights. Then comes the problem of
litigation executive. According to the definition given by
legal scholars, litigation executive refers to the following
situation: the third party enjoys the qualification of the
litigant in the place of, and jointly with, the subjects of rights
and obligations for a specific object of litigation.142 The

A Reply to Certain Issues Concerning Judging Defamation Cases by
the Sup. People’s Ct., supra note 63.
142 SHINDŌ KŌJI: NEW CIVIL LITIGATION LAW 208 (Lin Jianfeng trans.,
China Law Press 2008).
141

186

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

validity of judgment undertaken by the third party is
equivalent to the subject of rights and obligations.143 In the
case of litigation executive, the plaintiff files the lawsuit in
this own name, rather than as the owner of substantive
rights and obligations. This is different from the case of
litigation agent.144
Litigation executive theory provides a reasonable
explanation for the separation of the qualification of
litigation subject and civil subject. In the posthumous harm
cases, who will be the qualified plaintiff? Following the ideas
of the previous text, I would emphasize my findings as
follows: Firstly, in the case of converted interests, the close
relatives whose intrinsic interests are violated enjoy the
substantive right of claim. The problem of plaintiff
qualification can be properly resolved in light of this.145
Secondly, in the case of extended interests, the intrinsic
interests of the close relatives themselves are not violated, so
they enjoy only litigation rights but no substantive rights.
That is, the close relatives are only litigation executives.
Thirdly, in the case where body interests are violated, bodily
integrity is actually an extended interest. Thus, the range of
the plaintiff should be confined to the close relatives of
litigation executives. But in grave-related disputes, the
accused violates the interests of the whole family as a
community. The plaintiff files the lawsuit as the person who

Id.
Litigation executive consists of a legal litigation executive and an
arbitrary litigation executive. The law grants the right of the former,
while the right of the latter comes from the will. Id.
145 It should be noted that the intrinsic interests of the close relatives are
violated only under legal fiction. In Anonymous Case, it was improper for
the Ministry of Civil Affairs to file the lawsuit in the absence of close
relatives. The ruling of the court conformed to legal principles. Id.
143
144
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holds substantive rights. In China's judicial practice, the
interests of the deceased’s family are compensated in the
form of spiritual harm compensation.146 The plaintiff ranges
from the partner and close relatives of the deceased, to the
deceased’s offspring.147 I endorse this opinion.
Another question is, since the close relatives enjoy the
litigation right as the legal litigation executive, can the
litigation right be conferred to any person according to the
will of the deceased during his life? If the litigation executive
is designated by the deceased during his life, then what will
be the validity of the litigation right? I believe that in
posthumous harm cases, the designated litigation executive
is not only valid, but enjoys higher priority than legal
litigation executive. The fundamental reason is that the
designated litigation executive conforms with the objective
of autonomy of the will. The ante-mortem act of
authorization should be fully respected. According to Article
82 of the Supreme People's Court Opinions on Several Issues
of Implementation of General Principles of the Civil Law of

See Jun, supra note 127, at 10-11.
For typical cases, see [lawsuit brought by Zeng Haisheng and Zen
Kuang against the village committee of Sitang Village, Qianchang Town,
Jingshan County for personal injury and compensation claim] (No. 47
judgment of first instance by Jingshan County People's Court 2007);
[lawsuit brought by Xiao Wuqiu and Xiao Zhouqiu against Yan Yuewen
for violation of reputation right] (No. 121 judgment of first instance by
Chaling County People's Court 2009); [lawsuit brought by Wang
Shunpu, Wang Shunhua and Wang Shunpin against Xu Mingwu and
Chen Changfu for right violation and compensation claim] (No. 32
judgment of first instance by Anxiang County People's Court 2000);
[lawsuit brought by Liu Jinxiang, Liu Jiehuang, Liu Guojian and Liu
Er'feng against Wei Jinbin, Xie Zaisheng and Cao Renzhen for violation
of property right and compensation claim] (No. 183 judgment of first
instance by Xunwu County People's Court 2008).
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the People's Republic of China (Trial), the agency behavior
of the agent that already takes place before the death of the
principal and continues after death for the benefit of the
inheritors of the principal is deemed as valid.148 If the
substantive rights conferred by the principal are still valid
after the death of principal, the authorized litigation rights
should be valid as well.
D. PROTECTION TERM
The well-known case of "Defaming Han Yu” has
aroused the controversy of a protection term in posthumous
harm.149 In this case, Guo wrote an article suggesting that
Han Yu, the man of letters in Tang Dynasty, died of venereal
disease.150 Han Sidao, the 39th generation of Han Yu, sued
Guo for defaming the deceased according to the criminal law
of Taiwan and won.151 The question is: Should there be a
protection term of interests of the deceased in posthumous
harm cases?152 China's existing laws contain no written
regulations on this, except the protection term of the

In case a principal is in any of the following circumstances after death,
the acts performed by the agent he entrusted shall be regarded as
effective if the agent does not know the principal has died. See 最高人民
法院关于贯彻执行《中华人民共和国民法通则》若干问题的意见(试行)
[Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning
the Implementation of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China (For Trial Implementation)] (deliberated and
adopted at the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court on
January 26, 1988).
149 See YANG RENSHOU, FAXUE FANGFA LUN [METHODOLOGY OF LAW] 3
(China University of Political Science and Law Press 1999).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
148

2015

WHERE LAW MEETS CULTURE

189

copyright of the deceased.153 Looking at the legislative
examples from the perspective of comparative law, we can
find two forms of protection: definite term and uncertain
term. For example, the statutory laws of various states in the
U.S. generally specify the protection in definite terms.154 The
protection term of the interests of the deceased ranges from
10 to 100 years. German civil law adopts the protection with
an uncertain term.155 It is only specified that the term of
validity of copyright is 70 years after death. However, there
are no specifications in the protection term of other interests
of the deceased. I insist that China's civil code in the future
should adhere to an uncertain protection term for the
following reasons.
Firstly, if the interests of the deceased are to be
protected as legal rights, then there will be no problem
setting the protection term, since only rights have protection
terms, not benefits.
Secondly, if a definite protection term is
implemented, then the determination of the protection term
will completely rely on the discretion of the legislators. Thus,
it will be difficult to explain why the protection term is 50
years instead of 70 years. If an uncertain protection term is
adopted, then in the case of extended interests, the length of
the protection term only depends on the claim of the
plaintiff. If there is no qualified plaintiff, then the right of
action is revoked. The legislators do not have to ponder
upon the appropriate term of protection.
Thirdly, the time of existence of the interests of the
deceased is inconsistent. When the common interests of the

See Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, at art. 21.
See Smolensky, supra note 131, at 733.
155 Id.
153
154
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family of the deceased are violated, the duration of the
interests of the body related to the grave is the longest.
Moreover, folk customs vary from place to place. The nondiscretionary implementation of the protection term is futile.
In a few words, posthumous interests are constantly
declining. When the memory of the deceased has faded and
the interests of protecting the ante-mortem image of the
deceased dwindle over time, there will be less need for
protection. For instance, the manufacturing and selling of
the golden card printed with the image of Lu Xun, who
passed away in 1930s, in the name of commemorating a
modern wise man is an act of posthumous harm.156
However, the manufacturing and selling of the golden cards
printed with the image of great poets Li Bai and Du Fu, who
lived two thousand years ago during the Tang Dynasty, or
the publication of a postcard printed with the image of Qin
Shihuang, who was the first Emperor in Chinese history, is
not an act of posthumous harm.157
E. UNSETTLED ISSUES
The theoretical issues associated with posthumous
harm are highly complex. These issues are rarely covered by
law, and remain to be settled. On the microscopic level, how
can the private law relief be bridged with the public law
relief in posthumous harm cases? On the macroscopic level,
how can legal fiction be paired with legal tools to prevent it

See [Lawsuit brought by Zhou Haiying against Shaoxing Yuewang
Jewelry and Gold Company for violation of the portrait right of Lu Xun’]
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Qingshi Yu Dafu Minshi Juan [Instructions Asked
from the Supreme Peoples Law and Reply (Civil Affairs)] China Law
Press 92-93 (2004).
157 Id.
156
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from degrading into pure reasoning? This question is
important to prevent the legislature from creating something
out of nothing. As the interests prior to death are extended,
will the ‘worldliness feature’ of civil law only have symbolic
meaning? Or we can ask, is the principle of legal capacity
really that important? I firmly believe that the reflections
inspired by posthumous harm cases will bring about a
breakthrough in civil law theory.
V. CONCLUSION
Death is an unwelcome but inevitable word. When
talking about the legal issues related to death, we need to
have not only the wisdom of life, but also moral courage.
Traditional civil law only concerns the living and
posthumous harm is usually selectively ignored by jurists.
What the private law can do is no more than preventing the
name of the deceased from being trampled on, preventing
the body from being treated as property by others, and
providing a decent funeral. However, posthumous harm is
not as simple as holding a funeral. The ante-mortem
behaviors of the deceased are, after all, an objective
existence. Thus, various vested interests arising from it have
to be taken into the legal domain. In modern society, when
we put philosophical disputes aside, respecting the deceased
is no longer a vague moral claim, but a legal norm that needs
to be obeyed by the living.
In Chinese traditional culture, it is believed that what
one has done during his life can be freely discussed by the
later generations. Mocking the ancient people has already
become a heated cultural phenomenon. Civil law only
provides limited relief to posthumous harm and it will
dampen the enthusiasm of the modern people in their
commentary on the ancient people. Generally speaking,
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posthumous relief is not to engage the deceased in tacky
calculation of cost and profit, but to provide a reasonable
expectation about the unknown world.

